By Andy The Gabby Cabby | 3 November 2026
Thousands of families had their Child Benefit payments suspended after HMRC changed a successful fraud-detection system. Now, during a Public Accounts Committee hearing, Rupert Lowe has been asking a very simple question: who actually authorised those changes, and where is the accountability?
The answers raise serious questions about how decisions are made inside one of Britain's most powerful government departments.
A successful pilot — and a disastrous rollout
Let's start with the original idea, because tackling fraud and error in the benefits system is something I fully support.
HMRC wanted to identify people who had moved overseas but continued receiving Child Benefit despite no longer being entitled to it.
It used international travel information supplied by the Home Office, alongside employment records, to investigate potentially incorrect claims.
The original pilot was successful.
According to the government, a team of just 15 investigators prevented approximately £17 million in wrongful payments in under 12 months.
That's precisely the kind of work taxpayers should expect from government departments.
But when HMRC expanded the scheme in 2025, something important changed.
The department removed an upfront check against PAYE employment records — a safeguard that had helped identify people who were still working in Britain.
The consequences were significant.
Some 23,794 Child Benefit claims were suspended, and subsequent investigations established that a substantial majority of the affected claimants were actually eligible for payments.
Families who had done nothing wrong were suddenly left dealing with suspended benefits and the difficulty of proving their entitlement.
The National Audit Office subsequently identified weaknesses in HMRC's governance and risk management.
Rupert Lowe asks the obvious question
During the Public Accounts Committee hearing on 29 October 2026, Rupert Lowe questioned HMRC chief executive John-Paul Marks about the decision to remove those safeguards.
The National Audit Office had identified a workshop in May 2025 involving operational staff, analysts and policy officials, during which changes to the original approach were decided.
Lowe wanted to know who made those decisions, whether meeting minutes existed and who had taken responsibility.
Marks acknowledged his overall accountability as chief executive and explained that officials had been encouraged to innovate and expand successful projects more quickly.
However, when pressed about the workshop records, he said he would check their precise nature and whether minutes existed.
That is an important distinction. The hearing did not establish that no documentation existed, but it left questions about the decision-making process unresolved.
And that's exactly my concern.
When a government department makes changes affecting thousands of families, there should be a clear record of who approved them and why.
The Professional Standards Committee revelation
Lowe's questioning didn't stop there.
He turned to Jonathan Athow, an HMRC director general who also chairs the department's Professional Standards Committee.
Lowe explained that he had examined summaries of the committee's four meetings in 2025 and had found no mention of the Child Benefit travel-data intervention.
Athow confirmed that the matter was discussed in 2026, following the problems.
He explained that the committee generally considers broader professional standards rather than individual operational interventions.
That explanation is worth considering, but it also raises another question.
If a project affecting tens of thousands of families can undergo significant operational changes without the issue reaching this particular standards committee, what other oversight mechanisms were responsible for identifying the risks?
HMRC says it has since strengthened its governance and safeguards.
I would like to see those improvements subjected to proper scrutiny.
Tackling fraud and protecting innocent families
There's another side to this story, and it shouldn't be ignored.
During the hearing, John-Paul Marks stated that approximately 9,000 ineligible claims had been stopped, generating savings exceeding £50 million.
That is a substantial amount of public money.
Fraud and error in Child Benefit were estimated at approximately £270 million in 2024–25.
So there is a genuine problem to address.
But why should tackling fraud mean exposing innocent families to unnecessary hardship?
Surely the objective should be to identify incorrect payments accurately while protecting those who are legitimately entitled to support.
The failure wasn't necessarily the decision to investigate suspected fraud.
The failure was removing safeguards without adequately assessing what might happen to innocent claimants.
Should Child Benefit eligibility be confirmed annually?
Lowe also proposed a relatively straightforward idea.
Why not ask Child Benefit recipients to confirm their eligibility once a year?
HMRC explained that the department generally favours targeted, risk-based checks because millions of families receive the benefit and universal annual checks could create additional administrative burdens.
There are arguments on both sides.
An annual declaration could create a clearer record of eligibility, but it would also impose additional requirements on families who have done nothing wrong.
Personally, I think the proposal deserves serious consideration, particularly if technology could make the process quick and straightforward.
What matters is finding a system that protects public money without unnecessarily disrupting legitimate claims.
The bigger question: who is accountable?
One of the reasons this hearing caught my attention was its wider significance.
I run a private-hire business. There are licensing requirements, records, inspections and procedures that I am expected to follow.
If something goes wrong, somebody is expected to answer for it.
Government departments should be subject to standards of accountability that are at least as robust.
HMRC says it has restored the PAYE safeguard, introduced additional protections and changed how it approaches these investigations.
Those improvements are welcome.
But the public is entitled to know how the original decisions were reached, who approved them and what systems now prevent similar mistakes.
And with further scrutiny of HMRC's powers to recover tax debts directly from bank accounts, questions about oversight and public trust become even more important.
My view is simple: public money must be protected, innocent people must not be punished for administrative failures, and those making significant decisions must be accountable for the consequences.
That's what Rupert Lowe's questioning brought into focus.
Watch my full video
I examine the parliamentary exchanges, the questions raised by Rupert Lowe and the wider implications for accountability inside HMRC.
Watch the full video on Andy The Gabby Cabby
Official sources
This article contains commentary and opinion alongside information drawn from official parliamentary and government sources.
